PEACE IS WITHIN OUR GRASP

By Saleh AA Younis
November 17, 1999
Visafric

Today, perhaps for the first time since May 1998, I read a sober, well-written article at Walta that attempts to explain the Ethiopian Government’s trepidation with respect to the Technical Arrangement. It only mentions the Eritrean President once and it makes no reference to his mental health or emotional state—which, for Ethiopian writers, is quite revolutionary.

The writer’s summaries of why Ethiopia finds the Technical Arrangements unacceptable are as follows:

a) the territories from which Eritrea will withdraw are not spelled out in advance;

b) the date between cessation of hostilities and commencement of Eritrean withdrawal is too long (48 days);

c) The role of the UN Peacekeepers is overarching and violates Ethiopian sovereignty and independence: the Blue Helmets put limits on the authority of the reinstated Ethiopian civilian administration with respect to display of weapons, authority to deport, authority to resolve grievances.

d) The peace plan does not adequately address the issue of who is the aggressor and who is the victim and failing to answer that question, it treats aggressor and victim alike.

TREATING AGGRESSED AND VICTIM ALIKE

The short rebuttal to "Time for a New, Clean Document" is, of course, "Time for a New, Clean Reading Glasses." Because all these questions have been addressed repeatedly by the OAU and the ever-shuttling American mediators. But to encourage dialog I’d like to treat his writing seriously and address each concern beginning with the last one:

True, the Technical Arrangement does NOT identify who is the aggressor and who is the victim and, as the writer correctly states, the peace proposal is drafted with the objective of bringing "two unruly parties to heel." There is a reason for this. Ethiopia may believe that it is the victim of unprovoked aggression; Djibouti may harbor this view; virtually every Addis and Mekele-based diplomat and NGO employee may harbor this view; even the OAU General Secretary may hold this view and the former Chairman of the OAU, Blaise Campaore, may have come to believe this view. But as far as official documents are concerned—mainly the Framework Agreement— which was drafted under the chairmanship of Mr. Campaore and the input of Djibouti’s former president—as well as the subsequent Modalities, the issue of investigating the root causes so as to render judgment as to who was the aggressor and who was the victim is to be deferred pending the outcome of an investigation that would be initiated AFTER the peace proposals are accepted and implemented. Ethiopia may have accepted the Framework Agreement because it believed—based on assurances from Djibouti and Burkino Faso— that the eventual documents WILL label Eritrea the aggressor and Ethiopia the victim. But that is a calculation that Ethiopia made which, in retrospect, has proven to be wrong. It cannot retroactively reinterpret the Framework Agreement. The spirit with which the Framework Agreement was drafted was explained in detail by the past Chairman of the OAU who wrote:

"We note the gap which still exists between your respective positions on the origin of the crisis and the ways and means of emerging from it. In our reflection we have drawn the conclusion that the events which took place between 6 and 12 May 1998 were a fundamental element of the crisis that evolved between the two countries. Those were the events which revealed the crisis to the international community and with which the OAU was seized. It, therefore, appears fundamental that any search for a peaceful solution should take into due account this element. We have also been led to the conclusion that the events prior to those of 6 - 12 May 1998 contributed to the gradual deterioration of the relations between the two countries. In the pursuit of justice and equity, it also seems indispensable that appropriate inquiries be carried out on the events between 6 - 12 May 1998 and those that preceded them such as the incidents that took place in July and August 1997. Those inquires will make it possible to pinpoint the responsibilities for the deterioration of the situation between the two countries."

Under these circumstances, the OAU could not and did not label Eritrea as the aggressor nor Ethiopia as victim. It simply said, we don’t know and we won’t know until we conduct an investigation. This investigation is Point 7 in the 11-point Framework Agreement:

7. In order to determine the origins of the conflict, an investigation be carried out on the incidents of 6 May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have contributed to a misunderstanding between the two Parties regarding their common border, including the incidents of July - August 1997;

There is no other way to say this: what Ethiopia is asking for—and not for the first time—is that the sequence of events in the OAU Framework Agreement be changed to accommodate its wishes. Ethiopia, as a party to the negotiation, is perfectly within its rights to ask for this change and it is then up to the mediators and Eritrea to respond to this request for this change. What it cannot do is pretend that that is what the OAU Framework Agreement called for.

SPECIFYING AREAS FROM WHICH ERITREA WILL WITHDRAW

This was one of the clarifications that Ethiopia requested on the Technical Arrangements and the OAU presented its response as to why it did not think it was practical for the mediators and the Technical experts to determine areas of re-deployment before cease-fire. Notwithstanding the OAU’s formal answer, Eritrea has agreed to the OAU Chairman's proposal that the "OAU determine the areas of redeployment."

Ethiopia's demand that areas of re-deployment be determined before cease-fire is, once again, its re-arranging the sequence of events so that everything it wants to get out of the Agreement is front-stacked and everything Eritrea wants—permanent demarcation—is pushed back. Interestingly, although Ethiopia is occupying indisputably Eritrean territories—or at least territories it did not administer prior to the Operation Sunset offensive—it has yet to unambiguously admit that it is. In fact, right after the Algiers Summit, in his press conference on July 12 the Ethiopian Foreign Minister would not even admit that Ethiopia is occupying Eritrean territory.

THE GAP BETWEEN "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES" and "ERITREAN DEPLOYMENT"

Again, this was adequately addressed by the OAU in its response to the Ethiopian Prime Minister: it is 48 days because the UN experts said that is how long it will take. If Ethiopia had accepted the Technical Arrangements, D-Day would have been in August and Eritrea’s withdrawal would have happened by now. It is somewhat perverse to argue, in November, nearly three months after the submission of the Technical Arrangement that 48 days was too long. Ethiopians might think that this is sticking to principle, etc, but in light of all the challenges Ethiopia faces--massive starvation, AIDS crisis, destabilization in the South, and freezing of development—it comes across as dogmatic and unnecessarily stubborn. And, once again, it will fall on Eritrea to show flexibility and good will.

PEACEKEEPERS vs. MILITARY OBSERVERS

As an African it offends my sensibilities that two neighboring African countries could not resolve their problems bilaterally. It offends me that the two neighboring African countries had no citizens civic infrastructure—youth associations, women’s association, students’ association, retired war veterans association, professionals association, in short any organized citizens’ group that could have stepped in and brokered the peace. In fact, the only groups that are somewhat talking to one another are religious groups and, I believe, historians will judge us harshly for this failure. It offends me that the two neighboring African countries could not solve their dispute through the relevant regional association, IGAD. While Eritreans and Ethiopians can point fingers at one another endlessly as to who was to blame for this, the fact is that the opportunity was lost when Ethiopia told the world that Eritrea is "occupying its territories." Having invited the world, Ethiopians cannot criticize the world for showing up.

A few years back I read an excellent piece by the great African scholar, Ali Masrui, who was recommending an African peacekeeping mission made up from the large African nations and representing all African corners: Egypt in the North, Nigeria in the West, South Africa in the South and Ethiopia in the east. This is potentially a good idea—but we as Africans are years away from that. Unfortunately, where we are in the last year of the 20th century is the following: Africa is made up of nations who are so poor they cannot even pay their membership dues to the OAU. Africa is made up of nations who are too busy putting out internal fires to worry about the fire next door. African nations are late, late converts to the idea of a sovereign Eritrea state; many of them equate Pan-Africanism with Pan-Ethiopianism. Given these shortcomings, how is an African observer group supposed to keep the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia over a 1,000-kilometer common border? It is not that Eritrea is enamored with the Blue Helmet folks; it is just that they are backed by people who are in a position to do something punitive if war breaks out.

As to the writer’s objection of how Ethiopia jealously guards its sovereignty and would not welcome limits to its authority to law enforcement, I am always amazed at how we Africans are supersensitive about our sovereignty when it comes to law enforcement but have no hesitation to letting the IMF and the World Bank dictate what we should grow and how much we should sell it for. If we spent less time worrying about the power of the State to discipline its citizens—which, in Africa, is hardly lacking—and more on what will improve the livelihood of our citizens—freedom, economic harmonization--we would be in much better shape.

In conclusion, I, like the Ethiopian writer think that peace is within our grasp. However, it will require a bit more flexibility from Ethiopia—the kind of flexibility that the Eritrean President showed recently and for which he got nothing more than ridicule from the Ethiopian Government.