THE NEED TO GO BACK TO SQUARE ONE
By Tefferi G. Yohannes

I read the Eritrean reaction (Peace Is Within Our Grasp) to my article entitled 'Time for a Clean New Document.' Since the author appears interested in a dialogue, I have taken this opportunity to express my take on his article. I also hope that the exchange of views helps people on both sides of the dispute understand the conflicting positions better.

First of all, if Eritrea is serious about withdrawing to pre May 1998 positions, it should not be difficult for it to agree to prior identification/verification of territory subject to redeployment. On the other hand, if one does not intend to withdraw fully, it would be natural for one to secure a cease-fire and then embark on procrastination. I hope that Eritrea has overcome the objections to prior identification, and based on that assumption, I shall proceed to the other issues I wish to raise regarding the Eritrean article.

On the subject of redeployment I have never heard the Ethiopian Government say that it will not withdraw from territories that were under Eritrean administration prior to May 6, 1998 and that fell into its hands following its victory at Badme in February 1999, and following the defeat of the Eritrean attempt to regain Badme in June 1999. Ethiopia did not raise concerns about this matter in the clarifications it requested of the OAU. On the other hand, what has been obvious is the Eritrean lack of appetite to even admit that Ethiopia is holding Eritrean territory as a result of battle-field gains - some estimate even more territory than that occupied by Eritrea in May and June 1998. I can only guess that Eritrea's leaders feel a sense of shame in admitting their losses to their people, but the truth has a nasty habit of showing up, as it did in this case in the 'Modalities' that were adopted in Algiers. I do feel that any fear that Ethiopia will not withdraw from territories that it took after February 1999, and that it did not hold before May 1998, is unwarranted. It has never been an issue. On this point I wish to draw attention to the fact that "occupation" is a term attributed to Eritrea's actions and not to those of Ethiopia. One can refer to the 'Modalities' to confirm that.

I also do not believe that Eritrea should continue to insist on maintaining the 50 (or 48) day gap between the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of its troops -again , that is, if it is serious about withdrawing its forces. If Eritrea means what it says that it wants the war to be over, and there is already prior identification/verification of territory, why should it insist on a timetable that would prolong the process? In his article, the writer dwells at length on the peacekeepers issue and attempts to introduce extraneous matters of very little relevance to the question at hand. His readers are expected to believe that Ethiopia wants a group of OAU military observers because Ethiopia can order them out. How can Ethiopia do that? Because, the writer argues, Africans find difficulty distinguishing between Pan Africanism and Pan Ethiopianism. This is the most far-fetched argument I have heard and I congratulate the writer on his creative reach. It is as if he believes that the military group would be composed of a contingent of starry eyed Rastas awaiting the divine command of the former Emperor. The author should realize that it is not the color of the observers' skin that is a problem for us. Ethiopia's objection emanates from the unwarranted metamorphosis of a group of military observers into a UN peacekeeping operation.

It is in his argument against an OAU force that the writer's lack of regard for the rest of Africa, and an exaggerated view of Ethiopia shows through. If he is uncomfortable because Ethiopia's position is better understood in Africa, that truth should cause him to stop and think why. My suggestion to him is to first encourage his government to accept the fact that Eritreans are an African people, and not something distinctly different as has been drilled in their minds before and since independence. I would also like to add that if Eritrea needs American protection, (as the writer seems to believe) such a concern could be handled bilaterally between Asmara and Washington. There is no need to burden the peace process with what is essentially a side issue.

As for the writer's attempt to teach us democracy, presented through the ill advised barb at Ethiopia's desire to safeguard its sovereignty 'when it comes to law enforcement' as contrasted to its dealings with the IMF and World Bank, it is my belief that he is treading on very shaky ground. In the first place, a spokesman for Eritrea's unabashedly one-man-show-government, is in no position to preach to anyone, let alone Ethiopia, about justice and governance. Moreover, I would suggest that for information purposes, the writer learn from both the Fund and the Bank about Ethiopia's very own reform program that continues to be implemented whether the global financial institutions support it or not.

By the way, Ethiopia did not invite ' the world to show up' when the conflict started in May 1998. Ethiopian officials had been in talks with their Eritrean counterparts on May 7 and 8, 1998, discussing border issues, with an agreement to continue at a future date when the full scale offensive got underway. The writer must be aware that it was only after repeated and fruitless efforts to reach the Eritrean President (who made himself unavailable) and following a large scale attack on May 12 that Prime Minister Meles addressed his Cabinet and later, the Ethiopian Parliament.

What was he expected to do when the Eritrean government sent three mechanized brigades across the unguarded border and occupied 400 square kilometers? The writer should clarify what he means when he says our PM invited 'the world to show up.'

I am also surprised when the article refers to the flexibility demonstrated recently by the Eritrean President and the lack of response from Ethiopia. Is the notion of "withdrawing in principle" something new, or a sign of flexibility when everyone knows that it is a tenet of the OAU documents? Is the eleventh hour claim that Zalanbessa is sovereign Eritrean territory a mark of conciliation? Is the stipulation ruling out unilateral withdrawal a step toward peace?

Can a completely new definition of status quo ante be considered flexibility?

More than that, the author needs to come down to earth and recognize that words like 'Eritrean flexibility' mean nothing to Ethiopians who see to this very day Eritrean troops on Ethiopian territory. After having started the war and refusing to budge until forced to do so in February 1999, Eritrea's leaders (in the minds of many Ethiopians) are getting away with murder by being required only to withdraw to pre May 1998 positions. The return to status quo ante is, therefore, the minimum possible measure that Ethiopia can accept. A more just demand would have required of Eritrea to pay for all damages inflicted on the two countries and peoples.

At any rate, we are where we are, and I would like to believe that the leaders in Eritrea (including the writer) know by now that without its concerns properly addressed, Ethiopia will not sign the badly flawed Technical Arrangements document. In fact if Ethiopia's legitimate concerns are to be properly dealt with, a substantial redrafting of the 'Arrangements' would be necessary. If Eritrea is interested in reaching a clear agreement it should be within the realm of possibility for Eritreans too, to countenance the elaboration of a 'New Clean Document.'

I realize that all this would assume the existence of a Government in Asmara that is renouncing war with Ethiopia, not one just biding its time until it takes delivery of new weapons and MIG's. Not that such deliveries would make much difference. I maintain that it is time to go back to Square One, both on paper and on the ground.

I would in particular ask the writer to zero in on what we here in Ethiopia consider central. Is Eritrea prepared to withdraw from all occupied areas and return to pre May 1998 positions? I am not referring to preparedness to redeploy in general as called for in the Modalities. That was why, though the Technical Arrangements failed to measure up to expectations, a sequel to the Modalities was necessary. What Ethiopia expects and what the Technical Arrangements were supposed to have guaranteed was commitment from Eritrea in specific terms to withdraw from all occupied land administered by Ethiopia until May 1998.

It must be obvious to the writer by now that progress cannot be made unless the Ethiopians are absolutely certain that every inch of territory occupied by Eritrea is vacated. It is not merely a question of land. It is also that of principle, thus how large or small the area is irrelevant. Aggression should not and must not be rewarded. That was what Ethiopia said a year and half ago. I cannot envisage that changing.

I fear that this is perhaps where, true to form, Eritrea's leaders might once again miscalculate and commit yet another blunder. They might still wish to hold on to some piece of Ethiopian territory, a mountain here and a village and a valley there. That will be a recipe for an unmitigated disaster and from then on talk about a peace process would amount to a fraud. You might call this Ethiopia's tripwire.

But perhaps I am anticipating too far ahead. Before we get to that potential danger which at this point is only hypothetical and may be unduly optimistic, there are still other issues that need to be attended to. I would assume that is why there is an on-going dialogue with the OAU. In the meantime, I am yet to be convinced that the flexibility attributed by the writer to the Eritrean president, is for real.

Wasn't even that not-that-all-clear utterance by him that the writer wishes to credit the Eritrean president for, contradicted by one of his disciples the next day? Don't blame me if I remain unconvinced about Eritrea's desire for peace. Yet, I have to admit, I have found the dialogue refreshing.