Time for a New, Clean Document
By Tefferi G. Yohnnes
Walta
11/1999

Efforts to find a peaceful solution to the 18 month long Ethio-Eritrean dispute have been deadlocked for some months. Almost six months have passed since the OAU in Algiers adopted the Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its Implementation, and although the US, the UN and the OAU developed a document known as the 'Technical Arrangements', the end of the conflict is still not in sight.

Under the circumstances, it would be desirable for the OAU under the Algerian Chairmanship to take a fresh look at the whole process and determine how best to overcome the obstacles that are in the way of achieving a breakthrough in this tragic conflict.

Addressing the Problems

It is clear for all to see that the process has been bogged down because the 'Technical Arrangements' have failed to be acceptable to Ethiopia. There are two possible ways out of this situation __ either one gets Ethiopia under duress to accept the Technical Arrangements, or one needs to rework the document to the point where it would find acceptance by Ethiopia (by both parties for that matter). The first option is unthinkable. The second is not only fair and just but it is also doable.

Taking into account the nature of Ethiopia's objections to key parts of the Technical Arrangements and the exercise undertaken to provide a measure of clarification to Ethiopia's many questions of concern, it is obvious that expecting Ethiopia to belatedly accept the Arrangements (as they are) would be unwise. Those engaged in mediation and those serious observers of the conflict should, therefore, concentrate their efforts on trying to address the fundamental concerns expressed which require a radical reworking of important provisions of the Technical Arrangements document. It must be Ethiopia's hope that is what the OAU is doing at the moment.

If there is the intention to address the concerns put forward by the Ethiopian Government, it would be necessary to proceed from an understanding of just what makes the 'Technical Arrangements' so objectionable to Ethiopia. It would also be important to reflect on the fact that the misgivings of the Government reflect the justifiable deep distrust among the Ethiopian people as a whole of the authorities in Asmara. As the aggressed party, Ethiopians would like to see at the minimum the full restoration of the status quo ante. It cannot give the benefit of the doubt as it is being called upon to do by the Technical Arrangement to the aggressor. "Where is Badme... on the moon?" was what was said by the President of Eritrea soon after the aggression and in an attempt to make fun of the OAU peace effort. That is a joke which cannot be overlooked by the people of Ethiopia when they are invited to trust the Eritrean leadership.Thus, the demand for concrete commitment from Ethiopia.

Take It or Leave It

Coming back to the discussion of the 'Technical Arrangements' which are the cause for the "untidy and inconclusive" approach to the dispensation of the conflict, it should be understood that as far as Ethiopia's leadership was concerned, the 'Technical Arrangements' were __ in important parts __ inconsistent with the Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its implementation, the two documents whose legitimacy rests in their acceptance not only by the two sides but by the entire African continent as expressed in the decisions reached at the Algiers OAU Summit of July 1998. Ethiopia was expecting a document that dovetailed into the 'Framework Agreement' and 'Modalities'. It was anticipating a document of considerable detail that provided a road map (time table) to get to peace, which __ had that been the case __ would not have required amendment.

But the 'Technical Arrangements' differed from the two documents already accepted by Africa in matters of principle and substance. Hence, the request by Ethiopia for clarifications.

It did not help matters to tell Ethiopia that what was being presented to it was an unamendable document. The adoption of such an approach, provided the opportunity for the Eritrean side to declare its acceptance "in toto", rendering efforts to reach an agreeable formula very difficult. We have all paid in terms of time and missed opportunities for the unfortunate manner in which the matter was handled, but not all is lost as the OAU Chair seems to be working to address the problem in a more realistic manner at this time.

Back to May 6, 1998

The return to positions of May 6, 1998 __ namely the withdrawal of Eritrean forces to where they were on and before that date __ has always been at the core of solution of the crisis as far as Ethiopia is concerned. As Asmara is the party that took military action and advanced well across the border at that time, Eritrea is understandably more interested in other aspects of the settlement, and has been trying to 'dodge the withdrawal' issue throughout the crisis. But after much twisting and turning the point has been reached when everyone is unequivocally calling for a return to May 6 positions.

The two immediate and interrelated issues that stand out in relation to returning to the way things were prior to the Eritrean invasion concern first the identity of the territories subject to Eritrean redeployment, and second, the long gap envisaged between the date of the cessation of hostilities and the start of Eritrean withdrawal.

On both these matters the 'Technical Arrangements' are found sorely wanting. In the first place, the document totally and inexplicably ignores the contents of the letter sent by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia to the Algerian President late in July in which he drew attention to the fact that for redeployment to commence immediately after the cessation of hostilities (as envisaged in the Modalities), the specific areas covered by redeployment needed to be worked out ahead of time.

Unfortunately, due regard was not given to the concern expressed by the Ethiopian Prime Minister leading to a situation in which Ethiopia was expected to sign a cessation of hostilities agreement (essentially the entire package) without any idea from where Eritrea would withdraw and, what is more, without the sure knowledge that Eritrean troops would in fact withdraw from all occupied Ethiopian territories. Predictably, the Ethiopian Government expressed its dissatisfaction with this, a position which is now more and more widely understood by the mediators and the international community at large.

It should be noted that that particular problem was compounded by the fact that Ethiopia had to wait for 48 days after signing the agreement before Eritrean troops would begin to pull out, a far cry from the call by the Modalities for a pullout immediately following the cessation of the hostilities. What burdened the 'Technical Arrangements' was the idea of determining the areas of redeployment only after the cessation of hostilities.

Getting around the problem would require dealing with the identification of the territories subject to redeployment prior to the cessation of hostilities. Doing so would be of vital importance as Ethiopia would secure a better guarantee of Eritrean withdrawal, and such withdrawal could immediately follow-the cessation of hostilities. It is indeed encouraging that the mediators have begun to examine this possibility at this time in consultation with the parties, thereby, embarking on an important revision of the 'Technical Arrangements' document.

Blue Helmets Along the Mereb

Another issue that understandably raised temperatures in Addis Ababa was the ill-advised departure from the Framework Agreement and Modalities that brought into the picture UN Peacekeepers whose duty could only be as described by their name __ "to keep the peace".

Anyone with any idea of the long and proud history of Ethiopia would not fail to understand that the idea of introducing "blue helmets" into Ethiopia would stop the peace process in its tracks.

What makes the introduction of peacekeepers more perplexing is the fact that in both the Framework Agreement and the Modalities, the need for such a force was not envisaged. It had always been the case that what was required was a modest OAU (supported by UN) group of military observers. For some reason __ probably the belief that UN troops could help reassure and bring Eritrea on board __ the idea of a peacekeeping operation was introduced. Such a deployment represents the most robust UN operation short of UN Chapter 7 enforcement action, and why this was found necessary for what essentially was an "observation and verification" mission is difficult to understand.

Let us also not forget the fact that the OAU was in effect being sidelined in all this. The peacekeeping force would fall under the UN, specifically under the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. But it is not only the OAU that would be pushed out of the way. According to the Technical Arrangements, the two parties would commit themselves to close cooperation between the restored civilian administration and the "international civilian component of the peacekeeping mission... which will observe compliance by the restored civilian administration". This is a far cry from what was envisaged in the Framework Agreement which stated that "Group of Military observers" would assist the civilian administration in the maintenance of law and order "upon its request".

It is obvious that for any progress to be made in the direction of achieving a solution to the crisis, reference to a UN Peacekeeping Operation would need to be excised from the text of any document that seeks to guide the implementation of the peace process. After all, as far as Ethiopia is concerned, sovereignty and independence are matters that are taken seriously.

Two Governments in One Zone

Among the more blatant infringements of sovereignty that the 'Technical Arrangements' bring into the picture are the prohibitions made regarding what the returned administration cannot do, rendering it a truncated and phantom body basically under UN "big brother" supervision.

Unlike the Framework Agreement and the 'Modalities', the Technical Arrangements introduces prohibitions on the displacement and deportation of persons by the civilian administration, the prevention of the militia to display weapons; and to top it all off the UN Peacekeeping mission is expected to establish a local grievance resolution mechanism that would allow the UN to "rap the knuckles" of the local administration, if "it doesn't behave".

How and why the Technical Arrangements got into this mess is untold, but one can conclude that bringing such elements into the picture could have been designed to make Eritrea more comfortable in accepting the proposal. What was ignored __ inconveniently as it turned out __ was Ethiopia's fundamental demand for a full return to the status quo ante __ that is for the return of the population, administration, police and militia to "the way they were", nothing more and nothing less. Ethiopia's demand is supported by international law which rules that in the case of aggression, a return to the status quo is an essential first step.

For whatever reason, the authors of the Technical Arrangements saw fit to include provisions that would deny the civilian administration the means necessary for law enforcement. This was seen by Ethiopia as an unwarranted encroachment on the day to day operations of the restored civilian administration. Obviously no sovereign state can countenance such a serious infringement of its sovereignty.

As for the grievance mechanism, in addition to introducing a parallel UN administration with oversight powers over the local authorities, the discretion given to the Peacekeeping mission to establish it or not, makes it abundantly clear that the UN and not the administering Government is in charge.

It should be noted that Ethiopia's objection should not be taken to mean that it intends to carry out deportations, to dislocate people, or to otherwise infringe on their human rights. The misgivings of Ethiopia are rather based on the assignment by the Technical Arrangement of such rights due to sovereign states, to the realm of UN review and oversight, thereby preventing the return to the status quo ante; a fundamental demand of Ethiopia.

Who Decides What

A perusal of the Technical Arrangements would give the reader the impression that the whole objective of the international peace effort is to bring two unruly parties to heel whether they like it or not rather than to reverse an aggression. One example of this is seen in the manner in which bodies essential to the peace process are established and run. A number of bodies are to be set up with the UN very clearly at the helm. They include the:-

· Neutral Commission

· Follow-up Commission (Political and Military)

· Verification Mission (so called Peacekeeping Mission)

· Independent and impartial body to carry out an investigation into the origins of the conflict

· Boundary Commission

· Arbitration Mechanism for the Settlement of Humanitarian issues and the socio-economic consequence of the conflict The establishment of these bodies is basically in UN hands, and their decisions are final. To cite an example, even those like the follow-up (political) commission and the follow-up (military coordination) commission are chaired by the UN, and decisions are made by the chairman.

The approach evidently taken in the establishment of these bodies does not take into proper measure the interest of the parties concerned, and in our case the aggressed party, Ethiopia. The participation and role of our country is not taken into account. We are dealt with as if we were co-responsible for the conflict. While we recognize that in a peace process as justice blind as this one, the aggressed party can not ask to be considered in a different manner than the aggressor party, it is, at a minimum, imperative that in the establishment of these bodies, Ethiopia (as a party to the conflict) should be fully consulted at all times. Consultation should be an essential element of the entire peace process.

Double Standards

The application of double standards may be the order of the day in todays world. But as far as we are concerned, nothing demonstrates vividly the application of double standards as the policies adopted by 'those who count' towards India and Pakistan as compared to their approach to the Ethio-Eritrean dispute.

The long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan is not at issue here. We are only drawing attention to the most recent and grave incident __ the incursion of Pakistani backed insurgents across the line of control into Indian administered Kashmir.

It is not my intention to make a judgment on the merits or demerits of the cases pursued by India and Pakistan. My desire is only to demonstrate how faced with very roughly similar circumstances, the international community reacts in graphically different ways.

When Pakistani-backed-forces crossed the Line of Control nobody asked for India to undertake an unconditional cease-fire, whilst Ethiopia was asked to do so when regular Eritrean troops crossed the border. No independent proof was required of Pakistani incursion. That the incursion had happened was assumed. In our case, the OAU Ambassadorial team had to verify that the territories taken by Eritrea had earlier been administered by Ethiopia. Furthermore, the US and others called on Pakistan publicly and in no uncertain terms to withdraw. Nothing of the sort was directed at Eritrea. Instead the UN called for an unconditional cease-fire and a voluntary embargo on both sides.

Furthermore, the rich countries halted development cooperation activities with Ethiopia, while it was Pakistan that bore some of the brunt of similar action by the international community. Moreover in our case the IMF and World Bank stopped their support on non-economical (purely political) grounds with the full knowledge that it was the victim __ Ethiopia __ that was going to be affected more.

Can the Ethiopians be blamed for thinking that there is no justice in the world?

What the Agreements are Worth

Any discussion on the peace process must at some point come to an analysis of the status of the documents referred to earlier in this article. We must be clear on the status of the agreements and documents we are talking about. It is Eritrea's view that the Framework Agreement, the Modalities and the 'Technical Arrangements' are equally part of one package. What Eritrea fails to mention is the fact that while the Framework Agreement and the Modalities have been accepted by the parties and endorsed by the OAU Summit, the 'Technical Arrangements' document has no such authority and legitimacy. It has not received the acceptance of Ethiopia and neither has it been endorsed by the OAU.

There is, therefore, a world of difference in the legitimacy and authority of the documents under discussion. In view of the fact that the 'Technical Arrangements' document is "draft working paper" that, without OAU endorsement like the others, is subsequently subject to improvement, we should not get too hung up about it and be ready to improve the text.

Moreover, taking into particular account that the status of the 'clarifications' provided following Ethiopia's request is unknown, it would be advisable to work on a new clean document that would reflect the content and spirit of the 'Framework Agreement' and 'Modalities' and that would provide a clear road map for what is to be done.